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Sabine Gruebler killed her husband and his brother’s son with an axe in the night between 26 
and 27 March in 1774 in the Electorate of Saxony. She did this “out of love,” because, “we 
all have to die” in the end.1 What followed in this lengthy trial was a heated discussion of 
Sabine Gruebler’s state of mind: was she an unstable woman suffering from melancholy, or 
was she a cold-blooded murderess? Gruebler justified her actions through her—admittedly 
idiosyncratic—notion of love. Her interrogators as well as expert witnesses called upon from 
the medical and legal faculties sought to establish whether her rational faculties were 
impaired, and thus, whether she deserved a mitigated sentence. Gruebler’s state of mind, her 
gender and body, and her emotions were all investigated and assessed in deciding her fate. 
The presiding magistrates as well as the assembled witnesses presented a variety of emotional 
reactions—from shock to incredulousness, revulsion to pity. The twenty-first century reader 
of the trial cannot help but also react emotionally to the events described; yet it is clear that 
the way that Gruebler’s emotions and ultimately her actions were judged was inextricably 
intertwined with historically specific notions of these categories.  
 Norbert Elias, Emile Durkheim and Michel Foucault all explored how the 
development of legal institutions related to changes in ideas about emotions, morality and the 
body, and thus underlined the fundamental connection between penal law and the historically 
specific emotional culture of societies.2 In jurisprudence in contrast, as Susanne Karstedt has 
pointed out, emotions have been actively sidelined so that the “true preserve of law: reason” 
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can reign supreme.3 It is only in the last decade or so that legal scholars have begun to 
rediscover the integral relationship between law and emotions. Discourse about the law as 
“rational” is highly culturally-specific and reflects a particular legal ideology that places 
reason in opposition to, and as more valuable than, emotions. Yet this position overlooks the 
fact that emotions have always been integral to the law, particularly in the case of criminal 
law.4 Emotions were and are taken explicitly or implicitly into consideration in legal debates, 
in law-making, in the codified norms and in their application, especially in relation to 
paramount categories such as free will, individual responsibility and culpability, or the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a crime. Anger, rage, hatred, disgust, jealousy, 
shame, remorse, love: these are just some of the emotions that have directly or indirectly 
played a role in defining what conduct was worthy of legal protection or in need of legal 
proscription, why and how it was necessary to punish, and what feelings punishment was 
meant to evoke. 
 Social and cultural historians have long used legal records to shed light on those 
otherwise lost to the historical record: the poor, the disenfranchised, youths, and—
especially—women. The “new” social history of the 1970s and 1980s marked the beginning 
of a sustained engagement with legal sources as a means to answer questions that 
preoccupied social historians: about the lives and experiences of “ordinary” men, women and 
children. The allure of the archives, to borrow Arlette Farge’s phrase, could be found in their 
promise to reveal the intimate lives and voices of people long gone.5 In particular, the 
microhistorical movement that originated in Italy in the 1970s paved the way for the use of 
legal records to revive the everyday lives of lost worlds, and to find the “normal” in the 
exceptional. Early modern historians forged a particularly strong tradition of using legal 
records as a window onto the (almost always) illiterate common folk.6  
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The mining of such sources to illuminate the subjectivities of ordinary people has 
been particularly well developed in the historical literature on crimes of passion in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.7 It is perhaps most clearly in this work, for instance in 
Ruth Harris’s seminal Murders and Madness, that we have come to learn about constructions 
of selfhood in court from the late eighteenth-century onwards, the period in which the so-
called “modern self” is thought to emerge. Yet, Natalie Zemon Davis’s pathbreaking The 
Return of Martin Guerre challenged the idea that “selfhood” could only be seen as a modern 
category. The tale of Martin Guerre was in fact a story about the self: what it meant to take 
someone else’s identity, what it meant to take physical possession of a name.8 It thus 
complicated the notion of selfhood for the early modern period as it forced historians and 
readers to ask questions about how early modern people—and crucially, early modern 
peasants—negotiated their lives in highly complicated ways. It also opened up questions 
whose answers were not traceable in archival records: what did Bertrande de Rols feel when 
the new Martin Guerre returned to Artigat, and when she welcomed him into her home? And 
how did she feel when the “real” Martin Guerre returned to reclaim his stolen identity? 
Davis’s groundbreaking work thus challenged historians to imagine historical lives—that is, 
individual subjectivities and emotions—even when the archive proved elusive. Her work 
showed that early modern people had highly complex inner lives that historians ought to 
address.   
 Yet the question of how court records can be used and what issues they can illuminate 
has been a source of debate. In particular, historians have disagreed about whether criminal 
records can only be read as normative sources that produce and reflect institutional—societal, 
religious, political—values and discourses, or whether these sources can also shed light on 
how people experienced the law and thus provide more nuanced readings of the texture of 
everyday lives and realities.9 Can we know how Sabine Gruebler, the female murderess, 
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experienced the trial process and gave meaning to her actions, or can we only come to know 
how legal institutions interpreted those actions, how these institutions created emotional 
scripts of sanctioned and deviant behavior and of moral and legal responsibility? Even those 
more optimistic about how legal records can be analyzed are aware of the many layers of 
distortion that lie within these texts. Court records are highly constructed documents: They 
are often written in the third person by a notary, often redactions of much more lengthy 
interrogations, and often highly formalized versions of spoken dialect. Torture was utilized in 
many criminal trials until the nineteenth century, further distorting the “voice” of the accused.  
 Despite these reservations, many social historians have made excellent use of legal 
records. Arlette Farge, Carlo Ginzburg, Natalie Zemon Davis, Malcolm Gaskill, Ulinka 
Rublack, Laura Gowing to name but a few, have all shown how legal records can open a 
window on to the minds, emotions and experiences of those who became caught up in legal—
both civil and criminal—processes, in turn shedding light on cultural “mentalities,” including 
understandings of gender and the body.10 One particular focus has been on the meanings of 
honor, in relation to law, violence and gender.11 Yet, none of the most formative historians to 
use criminal records had been schooled in the “history of emotions” as we now know it. 
These historians have, in effect, long done the history of emotions without actually calling it 
that. The question this Special Issue seeks to explore, thus, is what analytical value an explicit 
engagement with the “History of Emotions” can bring to explorations of law and emotions. 
Can working with analytical paradigms, as set out below, help us refine our analysis of 
emotions, and their relationship to the law, in historical societies? My suggestion is that 
working with a more methodologically reflexive understanding of emotions, and how they 
can be analyzed in concrete historical situations, can deepen our understanding—and 
complicate chronologies of change—regarding the interrelationship between law and 
emotions. As I will argue, we need to understand emotions not just as inchoate feelings but as 
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bodily practices that are culturally and historically situated. Moreover, in order to historicize 
emotions, we also need to historicize the psychological, physical and material context in 
which a person experiences her emotions: that is, we need historically contingent notions of 
the self, body, and the material performance of corporeality.  
 While the history of emotions has been around for the last three decades—and indeed 
the Journal of Social History’s Founding Editor Peter Stearns did more than any other to 
establish this area of inquiry with his and Carol Stearns’ work on “emotionologies”—the 
field has grown exponentially in the last decade.12 Broadly defined, the four main strands of 
emotions history are emotionology (Stearns and Stearns); emotional communities 
(Rosenwein); emotional regimes (Reddy); and emotional practices (Scheer).13 Taken 
together, these methodologies examine the way emotions have been defined, governed and 
expressed in a given society and period, and how this has changed over time. A larger debate 
among historians of emotions has mirrored that of historians who use court records: can these 
histories ever get to the level of “felt” experience, or can they only ever touch the level of 
representations and norms, the standardized discursive nature of emotions?14 Can the history 
of emotions show how people actually “felt” and experienced their own emotions? Can legal 
records show how someone really felt when a neighbor called her a witch or a whore, or can 
they only show how the court created standardized narratives of dispute? And what can social 
and cultural historians using legal records learn from the history of emotions?  
 Much of the focus in the history of emotions, the so-called emotionological approach 
formulated by Peter and Carol Stearns, takes as the object of its inquiry the norms, rules and 
discourses governing emotions in a particular cultural context, a method especially applicable 
to examining penal codes as well as normative scripts of emotional behavior in the 
courtroom.15 In her work on the early Middle Ages, Barbara Rosenwein developed a different 
approach that has also achieved considerable traction, focusing on “emotional communities.” 
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This framework focuses on the different emotions, their expressions and their instrumental 
uses in specific communities: the “modes of emotional expression that they expect, 
encourage, tolerate and deplore.”16 In the legal context, Rosenwein’s concept has been 
applied to, for instance, an examination of the emotional communities of judges in early 
modern German witch-trials.17 Beyond these approaches, William Reddy has had the greatest 
methodological impact on the field, especially with his notion of emotives.18 Reddy’s term 
‘emotives’ denotes gestures and speech acts both descriptive and performative. Emotives, 
according to Reddy, are at once managerial and exploratory: an attempt to call up the emotion 
that is expressed, an attempt to feel what one says one feels.19 Where Reddy’s emotives have 
tended to focus on verbal expression—although he does not exclude other non-linguistic 
forms of expression—Monique Scheer has persuasively built on Reddy in her notion of 
emotions as practice, in which a “knowing body” performs emotions.20 Scheer thus 
underlines the importance not of “having” emotions but of doing emotions. Indeed, Scheer’s 
groundbreaking article was a response to the fact that emotions in history were being 
theorised in an abstract, non-corporeal framework. For Scheer, in contrast, there is always a 
physical dimension to emotion, “even if this is drenched with culture and history.”21 This 
means that not only do emotions have to be historicized, but so too does the body and the 
relationship between the two. The importance of the body in analyzing emotions becomes 
especially clear when considering emotions and legal practices, as is demonstrated in the four 
articles which make up this Special Issue. These articles show that ideas about guilt and 
innocence were often closely connected to how the body on trial was read and interpreted. 
The arena of the courtroom was a space in which identities were constructed and contested, 
and where repertoires of emotions were judged as providing evidence of guilt or innocence. 
The courtroom as a space in which divergent identities (of the “criminal” or “innocent’) were 
battled out thus lends itself well to Scheer’s methodology, as she suggests that:  
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Conflicts over emotional practices will provide particularly rewarding objects 
of study, as they produce many sources for explicating clashing emotional 
styles. These contain explicit and implicit assumptions about how emotions 
work, how they should be lived out, and what they mean; they are also tied to 
underlying concepts of the self, personal agency, and the moral values that 
flow from them.22  
 
 The law, and in particular litigation, is inherently a site of conflict. Defendant and 
plaintiff vie to put forward their versions of the “truth” in the eyes of the law; their narratives 
are suffused with notions of emotional norms as well as repertoires of embodied emotions. 
Implicit and explicit judgments of emotions come to the fore in the legal arena: what kinds of 
emotions should people show on trial, and how was this dependent on gender, age and social 
status? What emotions were seen as mitigating factors in committing a crime, and what 
emotions were deemed to be legally punishable or worthy of legal protection? How did these 
understandings of emotions interact with societal and cultural notions of moral responsibility, 
free will and conscience? And what sources are available to historians to pursue these 
questions? 
 A common thread weaving together the four subsequent articles on “Law and 
Emotions” is the interrelationship between the body, emotions and legal practices. Allyson 
Creasman’s article on “Fighting Words: Anger, Insult, and “Self-Help” in Early Modern 
German Law” examines changes in how early modern German burghers conceptualized the 
role of anger and provocation in cases of insult and defamation. Early modern German 
society and law held a conflicted assessment of anger: debate existed as to whether anger 
could mitigate a defendant’s culpability for defamatory outbursts, or whether such outbursts 
remained punishable since they posed a threat to public order. What becomes clear in 
Creasman’s article is that anger in early modern Germany was seen to have tangible physical 
consequences. Emotions and the body were thus inextricably linked. One case from Frankfurt 
am Main illustrates early modern burghers’ multivalent understandings of anger: it was a 
legitimate response to outraged honor, but it was also a destructive force that, uncontrolled, 
8 
  
could have deadly consequences. In 1638, a quarrel which had erupted between Daniel 
Jacobs and his neighbors, the tailor Martin Müller and his wife Cunigunda, was said to have 
cost the lives of Jacobs’ wife and their unborn child. Anger could be permissible in early 
modern Germany as a forceful defense of honor, so important in a society in which economic 
transactions were based on one’s good name and reputation. Yet anger could have potentially 
fatal consequences. Creasman’s article thus makes clear the deep connection between law 
and emotions at a time when emotions were seen to have highly threatening societal, 
economic and physical effects.  
 In line with revisionist accounts of the rise of the law in the early modern period—
which no longer view the increasing use of law courts as a symptom and effect of what 
Norbert Elias termed The Civilizing Process, but rather view the law as another (increasingly 
effective) avenue for early modern people to pursue conflicts23—Creasman’s arguments 
complicate Elias’ suggestion that standards of civility emerging in this period increasingly 
proscribed the passionate defense of honor and the pursuit of private justice. Indeed, 
Creasman shows that, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, far from demanding the 
suppression of anger, the law increasingly came to protect it, while at the same time seeking 
to tame its more destructive manifestations. 
 The relationship between emotions and the body is also at the heart of Katie Barclay’s 
essay on “Performing Emotion and Reading the Male Body in the Irish Court, c.1800-1845.” 
Barclay shows that justice in nineteenth-century Ireland was shaped by the bodies of men: 
physical appearance was understood to provide information about a person’s social 
background, character, sense of guilt, and honesty; it was available to be read by others in the 
court when interpreting events during trial. At the same time, how those on trial performed 
emotion was central to discussions of how their bodies, and consequently their character, 
should be read. The centrality of “character” to these readings of emotions, bodies, 
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comportment and clothing were heavily shaped by the science of physiognomy. We thus see 
a different understanding of the relationship between the body and emotions to that of early 
modern Germany; yet even in the post-Cartesian Irish court, emotions, character and the 
individual were still closely aligned with the body. Moreover, where emotions were evidently 
intrinsic to legal debates and law making, as shown in Creasman’s essay—that is, what 
emotions were permissible or punishable by law, and what emotions should be protected—
emotions were also central to judging guilt and innocence. The kinds of emotions that men 
displayed in court, Barclay demonstrates, affected how evidence was viewed and whether 
they received justice. As Barclay makes clear, the kinds of emotions that were performed, 
and more crucially how these emotions were judged, were highly gendered and dependent on 
age and social status. 
 The courtroom as a space or “emotional arena” in which particular emotions were 
performed, displayed and prohibited has already led to fruitful work in the exploration of law 
and emotions.24 What becomes clear in these four articles, however, is that we also need to 
think beyond the physical space of the courtroom—and beyond court records—as the only 
space in which law and emotions interacted. Marianna Muravyeva, in her article on 
“Emotional Environments and Legal Spheres in Early Modern Russia,” draws on legal 
petitions to show how plaintiffs sought to create favorable emotional environments by using 
complaining strategies in early modern Russia. Rather than employing emotional language, 
as one might expect, she shows that plaintiffs focused instead on descriptions of actions to 
create cultural and physical settings—which she terms an “emotional environment’—to 
ensure a favorable outcome. Muravyeva shows how emotions were transformed into 
practices, thus reinforcing Scheer’s argument that emotions are not something we “have” but 
something that we “do.” Through an examination of cases of abuse of parents from 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Russia, Muravyeva suggests that early modern 
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complainants used an environmental approach to emotional management, focusing on the 
creation of specific cultural and physical settings to externalize their emotions for successful 
mediation of conflicts. These settings emerged as a result of the interplay of individuals and 
their surroundings, including natural, social, built, learning and informational environments 
that provided a specific way in which emotions were consumed by individuals and 
collectives. We can thus think of these emotional environments as operating beyond the 
physical space of the courtroom.   
 Moreover, as all the articles show, trial records make up only one facet of the sources 
available to historians of crime. Allyson Creasman examines legal codes to explore how 
anger was assessed in early modern German law. Both Katie Barclay and Gian Marco Vidor 
draw on newspaper articles to examine not only how emotions, gestures, clothing and 
comportment of those on trial were reported, but also how those who witnessed the trial, 
spectators as well as journalists, became drawn into the trial process and contributed to the 
dynamics of the courtroom. The nineteenth century witnessed an explosion of media and 
newspaper reportage which found a particular intensity in the documentation of criminal 
trials.25 The emotions of the courtroom were scrutinized and depicted in sensational media 
reports, which in turn shaped how people thought that they should act on trial. Media reports 
thus both documented and helped shape norms and expectations of repertoires of embodied 
emotions in the courtroom. Newspaper reports show that the emotions of the courtroom went 
far beyond those directly embroiled in the legal process, an already sizeable cast including 
the judge, magistrates, juries, plaintiff, defendant and numerous witnesses. Rather the 
courtroom was a public, even social, arena. As Gian Marco Vidor shows in his article on 
“The Press, the Audience and Emotions in Italian Courtrooms (1860s-1910s),” the courtroom 
was a stage in which emotions were performed to an eager audience who were there to be 
entertained as well as to judge. By focusing on the public, a hitherto marginal actor in the 
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drama of the trial process, Vidor inverts the most common historiographical perspective: he 
puts the audience center stage. He shows not only that the audience was as scrutinized in 
newspaper reports as the plaintiff and defendant, but that their presence shaped the emotional 
dynamics of the trial process. In this way, the criminal trial became a place of emotional and 
social voyeurism for the courtroom audience and for public consumers of court news. 
Criminal trials could thus be seen as affective dramas which were shaped by a number of 
competing forces both inside and outside the courtroom: the magistrates, notaries and judges, 
as well as the media, spectators and readers of court news.  
 The kinds of sources that historians can use in examining law and emotions clearly 
shape the kinds of questions we are trying to answer. Indeed, there is a distinction to be made 
between looking in legal archives or in the court news for evidence of emotions, as pursued 
for instance by Muravyeva, Barclay and Vidor, and the more specific study of the conscious 
use of emotions in early modern trials, as documented by Creasman in her analysis of honor 
and anger in early modern Germany. Both approaches can shed light on the relationship 
between law and emotions, but the latter approach arguably can give a clearer sense of 
change over time: how the efficacy of certain emotions—such as anger—employed on trial 
waxed or waned. On the other hand, looking for evidence of emotions in legal archives might 
yield unexpected results. For instance, it can alert us to the absence of emotional language, as 
Muravyeva has shown in petitions in cases of abuse of parents. Likewise, Michael Ostling 
has shown how expressions of love can be found in the most unlikely of places, in his 
analysis of Polish witch-trial narratives.26 Indeed, identifying normative scripts of emotions 
as well as episodes of emotional experience is not a mutually exclusively endeavor. Ulinka 
Rublack’s analysis of the witch-trial of Katharina Kepler, the mother of Johannes Kepler, 
shows that there were clear understandings of what display of emotions was expected for a 
woman on trial for witchcraft in early modern Germany. Nevertheless, Katharina Kepler—
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like so many others—also insisted on her anger as legitimate in unprescribed ways.27 
Normative sources such as legal codes can be used effectively to shed light on the 
“emotionology” of a given time and place: what emotions were proscribed and protected in 
law, and why. Yet they clearly fall short as descriptions of the emotional experience of those 
caught up in trial processes. Newspaper records shed light on a different emotionological 
dimension: the way repertoires of embodied emotions were described and judged in the 
media. These sources can go—tentatively—beyond established discourses by showing how 
such media reports could in fact shape the emotions displayed on trial. Newspaper reports did 
not simply reproduce emotional norms, but shaped and created new emotional codes.  
 It is perhaps trial records and petitions—the latter which were used to such great effect 
in Natalie Zemon Davis’s pathbreaking The Return of Martin Guerre28—that present the 
historian with the greatest opportunity to uncover the “voices” of those normally absent from 
the historical record.29 Court records can reveal to the historian the emotional scripts of those 
caught up in the trial process itself. However, these sources too must be approached with 
caution, since we often do not know what actually occurred during the process of being on 
trial. The records will usually tell us whether the defendant was incarcerated during the trial 
process, and whether torture was applied. But what were the conditions? Was the defendant 
allowed visits from friends and family? Was he or she given enough food and kept warm? 
Were there informal interrogations and psychological manipulations that were not noted in 
the record? In the trial of Grethe Schmidt for infanticide in the duchy of Braunschweig in 
1659, which David Myers has documented, the suspect was kept in prison for 325 days with 
only her guards for company and with only one visit from her father.30 Such isolation 
amounted to a form of psychological torture and would fundamentally alter the suspect’s self-
narratives over time. Court records, thus, can only ever offer the historian a glimpse of the 
psychological interactions that occurred during a trial process. The often visceral nature of 
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the emotions described in court records should not deceive us into thinking that we have the 
complete picture before us. Nonetheless, with careful methodological acuity, trial records 
arguably offer historians some of the most valuable sources for examining the lives, minds 
and emotions of people who populated the past.   
 Indeed, we must be careful not to set ourselves up for failure by seeking to uncover 
what people “really” felt, buried in the heart, soul or “unconscious.” Just as an exploration of 
early modern selfhood, for instance, which I have attempted elsewhere, should not seek to 
capture any person’s “self” in its entirety, but can only illuminate a specific context in which 
a particular person attempted to reflect upon and give meaning to their person, so an analysis 
of emotions must seek to limit itself to how emotions were enacted at precise historical 
moments.31 Within these parameters, it is both possible, and indeed crucial, to explore not 
just how normative scripts of emotions were created through the law, but how people gave 
meaning to, experienced, and used the law and the legal process. This means not examining 
how people experienced emotions in general terms, but rather examining the way in which 
people transformed emotions into words, actions and proceedings. William Reddy reminds us 
that emotion words are always somewhat inaccurate, incomplete translations of ephemeral 
feelings into stable, analyzable and thus historical emotions. 32 As Michael Ostling remarks in 
reference to Monique Scheer’s work: “Emotions are not hidden in the heart: insofar as they 
exist accessibly at all, either to ourselves or to others, they are acted and enacted, bodily and 
therefore public documents of expressive culture.”33 Emotions in this understanding, then, 
can and should be accessible for the historian: they are bodily practices which, through a 
range of legal sources, are given expression in history.  
The four articles in this Special Issue demonstrate that emotions are inextricable to 
criminal law and reveal the range of sources available to historians of crime, from the 
formulation of legal codes, to pre-trial petitions and trial records, to newspaper reportage. 
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These articles show that there were clear changes in law and emotions from the early modern 
to modern periods, for instance regarding understandings of the physical effects of emotions, 
the way emotions were prosecuted and protected, the rise of court reportage in the media, and 
the development of physiognomy and the criminal “character” in analyses of emotional 
repertoires in the courtroom. At the same time, there are questions and concerns common to 
all the essays. Emotions are historically specific, tied to culturally constructed ideas about the 
mind and the body. More than that, emotions are embodied practices that can be only 
analyzed in concrete historical situations. And through this analysis, we can develop a deeper 
understanding not only of historical understandings of emotions, but also of the social and 
cultural context in which these emotions were expressed and given meaning.  
 These articles also suggest a series of questions for future research. Given the ever-
increasing bibliography on the history of emotions, we need to think about whether the 
existing models (emotionology; emotional communities; emotives; emotional practices) are 
sufficient or whether more, perhaps looser, all-embracing models are needed, and if so, what 
these might look like. One theme that arises from the articles is the analytic importance of the 
physical, spatial as well as emotional environment. Certainly, a deeper engagement with the 
physical and spatial context in which emotions are performed, alongside the body that is 
“doing” the emotions, would be beneficial. This ties in with the so-called “material turn” in 
history. If historians now understand that the way people emotionally relate to things has a 
history, we need to have a clearer sense of the material conditions in which emotions are 
performed.34 We see the importance of clothing, for instance, in Barclay’s analysis of the 
physical appearance of men in the early nineteenth-century Irish court. If clothing shapes the 
way in which people perceive themselves and the world around them, and the way that they 
themselves are perceived, then a history of emotions must incorporate both the body, its 
comportment and dress, and the material world. If we want to take performance seriously, 
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how people present themselves though their bodies and clothing needs to be part of that story 
too. This leads to my final suggestion, which is that an understanding of emotions, which we 
can see needs to be linked to the history of the body, must also be linked to historically-
contingent ideas about the self. Understandings of modernity are predicated on an increasing 
dichotomy between “interiority” and “exteriority.” Scheer reminds us that the dualism of 
mind and body, of external expression of emotion and inner “authentic” emotional 
experience, is predicated on modern Western notions of the self, in which the idea of a 
unique, individual interiority is granted status as a biological universalism.35 To approach the 
emotions of the past, or indeed, of non-Western cultures, requires us to also interrogate 
historically-contingent understandings of selfhood, so as to not unquestioningly replicate 
dichotomies between “inner” feeling and “outer” emotion, between experience and 
expression, between mind and body, emotion and reason. In short, an analysis of emotions in 
history can and should expand our understandings of other subjects of historical enquiry: of 
how people interacted with the material world, of how they understood their body, of how 
they made sense of their “self.” A history of emotions, therefore, can help us more fully 
understood how people lived their lives in past societies.  
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